What It Will Take: Learning from Pope Francis’s Peacebuilding Pedagogy

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Context

It is not too soon for those advocating for a shift from a “just war” to a just peace framework within Catholic social teaching and practice to anticipate the challenge of “reception”—the need, that is, for a wide consensus of Catholics across the Church to embrace Church teaching in order to authenticate it. Pope Francis and his advisers in the Vatican’s Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development clearly are listening to the call for such a shift. But for the vast and complex faith community that is the global Roman Catholic Church to shift indeed, the Church is going to need more than signals from the magisterium—even if those signals take the strongest possible form, an encyclical on gospel nonviolence such as advocates are calling for. While affirming their efforts, Francis also has a message to those advocates. So, if they hope to succeed, they—we—must do our share of listening too.

In his 2017 World Day of Peace (WDP) message, Francis offers the strongest papal mandate yet for Catholics to make active nonviolence normative in their response to injustice and violence in the world, but he does more than that. Yes, in at least three ways, he joins his voice to the argument that Catholic peace activists and thinkers have been making for decades: (1) He draws upon and promotes a growing body of biblical exegesis that rescues the Sermon on the Mount from easily dismissible idealism; (2) he recounts some of the many under-told histories of nonviolent campaigns and points toward the sociopolitical dynamics that account for their remarkable success; (3) he appeals to a consensus (which has come to include stringent just war thinkers) that recognizes that even putatively “just” wars inevitably contribute to vicious cycles of further violence, which call for creative transforming initiatives to escape.

But while Catholic proponents of active nonviolence have already been doing all of these things themselves, Francis also challenges them with additional points of agenda: (4) He sends a clear signal that any Church-wide reception of gospel nonviolence will require more than
critique of the just war theory, but must positively fill the space that just war theory has historically intended to fill. To do this, (5) they must anticipate the tasks of actually governing, through a “politics for peace.” Unless nonviolent activists are prepared—both psychologically and strategically—to help govern on “the day after” a tyrant falls or a regime changes, the politics of nonviolent change will remain unfinished, and reception will falter.

Anticipating the Need for “Reception”
In his 2017 World Day of Peace (WDP) message, Francis unmistakably demonstrates that he has listened to the appeal for clearer teaching on gospel nonviolence issued at a historic conference co-sponsored by Pax Christi International and the Pontifical Council on Justice and Peace (now folded into the new dicastery) in Rome the previous April. Three years later, the dicastery hosted a follow-up meeting, and with some regularity Francis continues to highlight not only the preferability but the power of nonviolence. All of this only begins to address the challenge of Church-wide reception, however.

To notice why, let us imagine that the Holy Father indeed responds further to the April 2016 “Appeal to the Catholic Church to Re-Commit to the Centrality of Gospel Nonviolence” not only by issuing an encyclical but by moving Church teaching away from a “just war” to a just peace framework. What then? What will prevent such an encyclical from going the way of Humanae vitae—Pope Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical on contraception, which broad swaths of the Catholic world have not “received” except with controversy or even cynicism? Fortunately, Pope Francis’s WDP message itself charts a path toward Church-wide reception. But advisers who assist the Holy Father in drafting any future encyclical, as well as activists who seek to amplify papal signals, will need to attend closely to the markers he charted there.

Anyone who reads Catholic Church documents learns to recognize a certain kind of savvy rhetorical strategy. The Vatican’s carefully finessed language may sometimes be frustrating in its nuance but it can also serve to balance considerations and forge consensus in a complex global community. Pope Francis thus exercises an appropriate Vatican savvy as he alludes to the possible use of “just war” criteria in his 2017 WDP message, yet leaves the theory unnamed—for now, neither rejected outright nor defended.
What Pope Francis names instead is the space that the Vatican and Catholic moral theology have historically hoped the “just war” theory would fill. Section 6 of the WDP message begins this way:

Peacebuilding through active nonviolence is the natural and necessary complement to the Church’s continuing efforts to limit the use of force by the application of moral norms; she does so by her participation in the work of international institutions and through the competent contribution made by so many Christians to the drafting of legislation at all levels.

Now because “just war” theory has long provided the framework for those efforts of the Church to “limit the use of force by the application of moral norms” (and indeed has helped build the architecture for international law along the way), this sentence might seem to validate its continued use. And yet the papal restraint that left “just war” theory here unnamed also recalls the unease that once prompted Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger—later Pope Benedict XVI—to wonder out loud whether “today we should be asking ourselves if it is still licit to admit the very existence of a ‘just war.’” After all, Francis is not done here.

**Francis Joins the Arguments of Peace Activists**

While the space for Church engagement in international diplomacy and public policy work stands in a mutually supportive relationship with active nonviolence according to section 6 of Francis’s 2017 WDP message, what the Pope does next is breathtaking. He insists that “Jesus himself offers a ‘manual’ for this [integrated] strategy of peacemaking in the Sermon on the Mount.” Such a claim points to the need to bring fresh and insightful exegesis together with historical evidence and social scientific analysis in a hermeneutic circle both informed by the biblical text and further illuminating it.

**Biblical Exegesis to Rescue the Sermon on the Mount**

Two things were at work in Francis’s calling the Sermon on the Mount a “manual” for strategic peacemaking. First, his use of the word “manual” is a most intriguing word choice. “Manualism” had been the neo-scholastic mode of Catholic moral deliberation ascendant from the Seventeenth
Century until the Second Vatican Council. Drawing on St. Thomas Aquinas’s carefully reasoned reflection on the natural law, the Manualist mode sought to rival Enlightenment rationalism. Whatever its virtues, it tended therefore to de-emphasize biblical sources and thus offered a comfortable home for “just war” casuistry. To now, instead, call the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5–7) the Church’s manual for peacemaking hardly seems to have been an accident.

In any case, a second signal is unmistakable: after reflecting briefly on the Beatitudes as a template for the virtues that any authentic peacemaker will embody, Pope Francis describes the Sermon on the Mount and the Beatitudes as “also a program and a challenge for political and religious leaders, the heads of international institutions, and business and media executives” to apply amid “the exercise of their respective responsibilities.” The manual that the Sermon on the Mount provides, in other words, is not just for the personal lives of particularly saintly Christians. It applies to the public realm. It elicits, as the WDP title has already announced, a “style of politics for peace.”

Here, though, is where we must especially anticipate the challenge of reception. Active nonviolence is not simply protest and certainly not passivity, as Pope Francis himself notes. Yet the unformed, uninformed assumption of many is going to be that practicing the Sermon on the Mount in public affairs is a lofty but idealistic notion and no more. To rescue the Sermon from an idealism that eventually leads to its dismissal as politically irrelevant, more than assertion or biblical proof-texting is necessary.

Just as the phrase “to be or not to be” has circulated in popular culture among many people who know it comes from Shakespeare but have never seen Hamlet, Jesus’s injunctions to “turn the other cheek” or “go the second mile” have taken on a life of their own. Many people—certainly in the culture at large but even among devout Catholics—may vaguely associate such phrases with Jesus but have never studied the Sermon on the Mount carefully. Serious biblical exegesis, however, recognizes these teachings as paradigmatic models for a sophisticated practice of active nonviolence that counters injustice with the creativity needed to transform social processes. Following the exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount by New Testament scholar Walter Wink and Christian ethicist Glen Stassen, another key to reception, therefore, will be to explain the social dynamics of active nonviolence by which courageously “turning the other
cheek” or otherwise loving enemies can expose injustice and turn the tide of bystander complacency into support.

**Telling the Under-Told Stories**

Pope Francis certainly knows the power of active nonviolence. In section 3 of his 2017 WDP message, he characterizes Jesus’s message as a “radically positive approach,” not just a negative refusal of violence. He then goes on to pair Jesus’s teaching about love of enemies with his stopping the unjust accusers who were about to stone a woman caught in adultery—thus underscoring that nonviolent peacemaking is inseparable from work for justice. He also reiterates his predecessor Pope Benedict’s characterization of enemy love as “the nucleus of the ‘Christian revolution’” and the “*magna carta* of Christian nonviolence.”

Here then is where Francis collates biblical exegesis with historical examples. In section 4 he outlines examples of how the “decisive and consistent practice of nonviolence has produced effective results” in campaigns by the Hindu Mahatma Gandhi, the Muslim Khan Abdul Ghaflar Khan, and the Christian Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. To be sure, Gandhi and King are iconic, sometimes to the point that hagiographic veneration disempowers their legacies. Fortunately, Francis continued with further examples of otherwise ordinary people wielding the power of active nonviolence:

> Women in particular are often leaders of nonviolence, as for example, was Leymah Gbowee and the thousands of Liberian women, who organized pray-ins and nonviolent protest that resulted in high-level peace talks to end the second civil war in Liberia.

> Nor can we forget the eventful decade that ended with the fall of Communist regimes in Europe. The Christian communities made their own contribution by their insistent prayer and courageous action.

Even while citing “the ministry and teaching of Saint [Pope] John Paul II” in these events, Francis follows the lead that his predecessor himself took when he wrote his 1991 encyclical *Centesiumus annus*. John Paul had given credit not so much to his own geopolitical leadership but—as Francis now quotes him—to “the non-violent commitment of people [at the grassroots]
who, while always refusing to yield to the force of power, succeeded time after time in finding effective ways of bearing witness to the truth […] using only the weapons of truth and justice.”

**Escaping Vicious Cycles through Transforming Initiative**

Amplifying Pope Francis’s message by tirelessly recounting these and many more such histories is obviously one key way to invite a wide reception of gospel nonviolence. But for a truly wide reception by which jaded opinion-leaders, or parishioners anxious about their nation’s security, take a second look at Pope Francis’s WDP message now—and hopefully an encyclical later—we must turn historical anecdote into global narrative by integrating biblical exegesis with social analysis. Again, though, the Holy Father charts a path in his WDP message, though this time perhaps more by papal intuition rather than explicitly.

At various points throughout the document Pope Francis argues for active nonviolence by citing cycles of violence and the need to escape them. The “horrifying world war [being] fought piecemeal” in the Twenty-First Century has resulted from violence upon violence, he notes. The Pope certainly does not deny that war may sometimes respond to injustice. Yet, he asks, “Where does this lead? Does violence achieve any goal of lasting value?” No, it leads “to retaliation and a cycle of deadly conflict” rather than any “cure for our broken world” (§2). That is why “the force of arms is deceptive” (§4). Gospel nonviolence is the truly revolutionary alternative, therefore, because “responding to evil with good” rather than “succumbing to evil” by responding in kind means “thereby breaking the chain of injustice” (§3).

Pursuing this line of reasoning should widen reception of the magisterium’s growing body of teaching on gospel nonviolence because the diagnosis of vicious cycles is something that practitioners of “just war” theory have already agreed upon. No one these days expects any war to end all wars, after all. Even anxious security-minded parishioners who are not well-versed in the theory, but expect the Church to allow wars in their name one way or another, will be more likely to give gospel nonviolence a hearing if the argument is not about whether the causes that are dear to their heart are ever just. Politicians often whip up support for dubious causes, of course, and one tact for peacebuilders is to deconstruct their jingoistic claims. But those who argue that war can never be just are unwise to imply that deeply-held causes are never just. Instead we will be wise to frame our arguments within a diagnosis of vicious cycles: in war, even
winners lose. Wars that are supposedly just still plant the seeds of new resentments, and thus new rounds of mutually reinforcing injustice.

Building on a wider consensus and acknowledging the legitimate concerns of those whom one is seeking to persuade are not simply smart rhetorical strategies; they were part of Jesus’s own pedagogy in the Sermon on the Mount itself. As the late Christian ethicist Glen Stassen, a leading advocate of “just peacemaking” theory, demonstrated, Jesus’s teachings in most of Matthew 5–7 come as a series of fourteen triads that reveal Jesus’s very approach to moral reasoning. Jesus’s consistent pattern was to first name the people’s “traditional righteousness” or morality, then demonstrate its inability to escape some vicious cycle, then offer a “transforming initiative.” His focus was not on dismantling traditional righteousness per se; a standard teaching such as “eye for an eye” was commendable so far as it went—in this case by limiting immediate violence. But traditional righteousness did not go far enough, as he made clear by diagnosing its inherent flaw in the vicious cycles that it failed to end. Instead, Jesus’s focus was thus on “transforming initiatives” such as those paradigmatic acts of active nonviolence that resist evil but not in kind. Still, that did not mean he fully disparaged the transitional contribution of traditional righteousness nor the willingness of those schooled in it to begin diagnosing its limited ability to escape vicious cycles.

Francis’s Challenge to Catholic Peace Activists
The space that the Church has long hoped “just war” theory would fill does need filling. Educating more and more Catholics about the demonstrable power of active nonviolence and training them in its practice will certainly be a major part of the work toward reception. Yet one reason that the “just war” theory has long seemed necessary is that it offers a form of discourse, a lingua franca across worldviews and ethical frameworks. Even those who doubt the justice of any war have sometimes needed to use it as a second language in order to counter calls for specific wars. Thus have they too engaged in those “continuing efforts to limit the use of force by the application of moral norms” that Francis identified in his WDP message, as they participate in “the work of international institutions” or contribute “to the drafting of legislation at all levels.” Ultimately, though, the need that requires filling is not merely for a common language. It is the need to govern.
For what if we actually win? As I have observed or participated in various social movements over four decades—reformist and revolutionary, violent and nonviolent, Christian and secular—neglect for this question has often been the great lacuna that has tripped them up. Working from the margins and struggling against hopelessness, they often have reason to be cynical about established institutions. An oppositional or “prophetic” stance may then become so much a part of their identity that it serves as the only psychological home in which they feel comfortable, and the “compromises” they might have to make in order to actually run things all feel like selling out. Absorbed in the urgent tasks of resisting unjust powers-that-be, activists may feel as though the task of specifying how they would actually exercise power in order to enact the changes they are calling is a luxury. But it never is.

However compelling may be the record of nonviolent campaigns in resisting injustice and bringing down tyrants, after all, and however superior their record of preparing for and enabling democratic governance in comparison to that of violent insurrection, the record of nonviolent governance is spottier. Thanks to the development of Gandhian nonviolence in the Twentieth Century, peace activists rightly point to far more victories overthrowing tyranny than either standard history books admit or popular imagination recognizes. But having won independence Gandhi’s own India became one of the first nation-states in what was then called the Third World to develop nuclear weaponry. Why? To “overthrow tyranny” is merely a double negative. While a double negative may equal a positive in pure mathematics, in social affairs a nonviolent revolution overthrowing Marcos in the Philippines or even the Soviet Empire in 1989 does not yet offer a positive model of nonviolent governance. We cannot expect to replace the just war tradition in the Roman Catholic Church unless and until we unreservedly embrace the challenge of governing on “the day after.”

Having been formed as a Mennonite in one of the so-called historic peace churches (HPCs), then entered into full communion with the Catholic Church in 2004 and been a leader in Mennonite-Catholic ecumenical dialogue, I sometimes hear my fellow Catholic pacifists expressing a kind of peace-church envy. But “beware what you ask for—you might get it.” The experience of HPCs is instructive, particularly as they have moved from more sectarian and apolitical social postures to an engaged social ethic embracing active nonviolence in contrast to what they formerly called “biblical nonresistance.” The centuries-long pattern of Church
alliances with princes, kings, and nation-states that peace-church thinkers term “Constantinianism” is suspect if not anathema to many of them. Historically and even today—perhaps especially among peace-and-justice activists—HPC members who work within the state have sometimes been suspect. Yet the more that social-justice advocacy succeeds, the more it invites a counter-invitation to participate first in policymaking and then in governance. And in every human community I know, governing requires some kind of enforcement, coercion, policing, even if it is nonlethal policing. One option for avoiding the dilemma has been principled Christian anarchism, which seems to offer a way to impact the larger society perpetually from the margins, through perpetual prophetic critique and small-scale local alternative patterns of life. But this only defers rather than avoids the challenge. For, logically, one must either abandon all hope that anyone else will actually listen or else must anticipate the question, “So will you help us do what you’ve been calling us to do?”

Not all Christian pacifists have avoided this challenge. For about five years in the early 2000s I served on an advisory committee on peace issues for the international program of Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), the relief, development, and peacebuilding collaborative arm of various Mennonite churches. During that time the committee commissioned a three-year special project. Prompting it in part was the insecurity many felt following the events of September 11, 2001. But the more important prompts were questions that MCC workers and partners around the world had been facing for years in conflict zones and failed states where “order” and “institutionality” and “security” were not necessarily code words for oppressive regimes. Rather, they named dreams of functioning civil society or even shalom. The goal, then, was to articulate within the framework of Mennonite thought and pacifist ethics a positive theology of order and governance that might even take back that word “security” from militarists.18

Admittedly, what was most controversial about the project among Mennonites was its willingness to consider (even if not yet endorse) a concept I had independently begun to interject into ecumenical conversations between Mennonites and Catholics—that of “just policing.”19 Initially as a resource for the historic international dialogue between Mennonite World Conference and the Pontifical Council for Promoting Church Unity from 1998–2003, I had sought to narrow the gap between just war and pacifist traditions by arguing that
If the best intentions of the just war theorists were operational, they could only allow for just policing, not warfare at all. If Christian pacifists can in any way support, participate, or at least not object to operations with recourse to limited but potentially lethal force, that will only be true for just policing. Just policing—and just just policing.²⁰

My goal on the Mennonite side was not to convince them to abandon their historic pacifism, but to press them and other pacifists to fill a major gap in their theory and practice: either define the very limited circumstances in which violence might be justified in demilitarized policing, or better yet, recover and design strategic models for nonlethal and nonviolent policing.

None of this need be so controversial among Catholics, however—even among Catholic pacifists. However much we ought to repent of all the dubious ways in which Catholics from prelate to pew have misaligned their allegiances to emperors, princes, and nation-states down through the centuries, we need not have the same allergy toward governance that some HPCs have had. As Pope Francis has affirmed on various occasions, “Politics, though often denigrated, remains a lofty vocation and one of the highest forms of charity, inasmuch as it seeks the common good.”²¹

Historically, just war thinking and “Constantinianism” have been the downside to a Catholic upside—the embrace of governance and protection of the vulnerable as responses to the legitimate concern for security that seeks to allow everyone “under their own vines and under their own fig trees, and no one shall make them afraid” (Micah 4:4). Catholic peace activists will only complete the transformation of Catholic peace theology if we embrace rather than dismiss that challenge. Yes, of course, we must highlight the histories of those double-negative social movements that have demonstrated the power of active nonviolence to resist oppression and overthrow tyranny. Continuing to develop pilot projects of the sort that Christian Peacemakers, Nonviolent Peaceforce, Peace Brigades International, Operation Dove, and other organizations are doing for the protection of vulnerable populations, in hopes that they will eventually be scaled up by governments as institutions for civilian-based defense and nonviolent humanitarian intervention, will be another especially crucial part. But we must do still more. Whether our hope is to provide alternatives to every form of violence, or render the exceptional use of lethal
violence truly exceptional by limiting it to just policing according to the rule of law, we must develop active nonviolence as a positive strategy not just for resisting nonviolently but for governing with less and less recourse to violence.

Conclusion
Pope Francis sees a “natural and necessary complement” between “peacebuilding through active nonviolence” and this continuing engagement. Many Catholic peacebuilders see “just war” theory as a distraction if not an obstacle to both. If we follow Jesus’s lead, though, we will not need to wait until all Catholic theologians, bishops, or other opinion-leaders are convinced to abandon their “traditional righteousness” and agree that there is no “just war.” Church-wide reception of gospel nonviolence and just peace can take root simply by moving on, as Jesus’s did, to those second and third points—the diagnosis of vicious cycles as proper complement to the social power and moral imperative of transforming initiatives.

Catholic peacebuilders can be grateful that the Vatican is listening, but we should also learn from Pope Francis’s pedagogically savvy rhetorical strategy. If we expect the Pope to take down the “just war” theory at one fell swoop in an eventual encyclical, we may be inviting disappointment. Everything in Church history and the development of doctrine suggests that the magisterium is loath to say that great Christian authorities of the past were outright wrong. Rather, popes and Church councils look for other clever ways to just move on. My prediction is that the “just war” theory will be damned with faint praise or die a death of a thousand cuts. Our best and quite realistic hope is the “just war” will continue going the way of capital punishment, which Pope John Paul II did not quite reject in theory but did reject for modern societies. Reception has obviously not been unanimous—how could anything be unanimous in the world’s largest religious body?—but it has been significant enough to move the public-policy needle in many countries.

Pope Francis’s 2017 World Day of Peace message, and section 6 in particular, is exactly what that process is going to look like. The job of Catholic peacebuilders is to amplify the signals—but first to be sure they are attending to all of those signals.
Notes


2. “An Appeal to the Catholic Church to Re-Commit to the Centrality of Gospel Nonviolence,” Catholic Nonviolence Initiative, 2016,

3. “‘Path of Nonviolence’ Workshop Concludes in Vatican,” Vatican News April 6 2019,

4. Most recently in the news at the time of this writing, Francis told a meeting of theologians that they “should also look to non-violence as a horizon” and make it one of the “constitutive elements” of theology (Gerard O’Connell, “Pope Francis to Theologians in Naples: One Cannot Do Theology Without Freedom,” America June 21, 2019,


6. To be sure, this insistence on the public applicability of nonviolence is not an innovation by Francis. While the Second Vatican Council had made a breakthrough recognition of the legitimacy of nonviolence by affirming the right to conscientious objection in Gaudium et spes §78, the refusal of violence even for purposes of self-defense here was

7. Pope Francis, “Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace”: “Nonviolence is sometimes taken to mean surrender, lack of involvement and passivity, but this is not the case” (§4).

8. The most famous spokesman for this widespread assumption remains the twentieth-century Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr; see, for example, “Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist,” in *Christianity and Power Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940), 1–32.


16. This is one of the statistically backed arguments in Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). Note, however, that the focus of Chenoweth and Stephan is nonetheless on nonviolent civil *resistance*, prior to governance, more so than robust nonviolent governance. Although they do find statistical relevance in how the former cultivates the habits and political conditions for significant characteristics of nonviolent governance, such as participation, consensus decision-making, resilience, creativity, and nonviolent structures, etc. For more on fostering nonviolent governance, see Véronique Dudouet, “Powering to Peace: Integrated Civil Resistance and Peacebuilding Strategies,” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Special Report Series 1 (April 2017), https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICNC-Special-Report-Civil-Resistance-and-Peacebuilding.pdf; and Nadine Bloch and


