

Globalizing Philosophy

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One of the most important lessons I have learned from Chinese philosophy is the power of the Image, which challenges the logocentrism of Amero-eurocentric philosophies. Wang Bi (226–249 CE) succinctly summarizes the relationships of image, thought and language to underlying meaning:

Image (*xiang*) reveals the meaning (*yi*), and speech (*yan*) clarifies the image. To exhaust the meaning nothing is better than the image; to exhaust the image nothing is better than speech. Speech arises out of images, and we can thus divulge the meaning through the image. . . . Therefore, speech is what clarifies the image and must be forgotten once the image is grasped; image is what preserves the meaning and must be forgotten once the meaning is grasped. [Speech is] like a snare used to catch a rabbit; the snare is to be forgotten once the rabbit is grasped. [Image is] like a net used to catch a fish; the net is to be forgotten once the fish is grasped. Thus, speech is the snare of image, and image is the net of meaning.¹

Accordingly, I was struck by the image on the cover of Bryan Van Norden’s *Taking Back Philosophy*. The sword-wielding Monkey King in attack mode seems to send the wrong message, confirming the fears of our xenophobic colleagues. Similarly, the words “taking back” and “manifesto” may easily be read as a declaration of war. Is this the true meaning of our multicultural endeavor?²

I heartily agree with Van Norden that Chinese philosophy, like other “non-Western” philosophies, has a vital role to play in the world today, and that it has much to contribute to global culture. It is not a mere museum piece or an exotic cultural artifact, but is both relevant to and even crucial for dealing with contemporary crises. It addresses aspects of the human condition and deploys effective methodologies that have been ignored or marginalized. Philosophers would do well to learn from the practical research of political scientists regarding the value of diversity: “If

we're in an organization where everyone thinks in the same way, everyone will get stuck in the same place. But if we have people with diverse tools, they'll get stuck in different places. ... [D]iverse groups of problem solvers outperformed the groups of the best individuals at solving problems.”³

Before we survey the road ahead, we must acknowledge ~~ment~~ where we have been and assess how far we have come. The last fifty years of Chinese philosophy's journey in American academia roughly parallels the trajectory of my own professional career. Just as Kong Zi set his mind on learning at the age of fifteen (*Lun Yu* 2:4),⁴ around the same age I set my mind on philosophy, after reading Plato's *Republic* in my Latin class. However, as a female undergraduate student in a field dominated by males I soon experienced a sense of alienation. Sanctioned by the overwhelmingly negative characteristics found in many esteemed philosophers, from Aristotle to Hegel and Schopenhauer, misogyny was condoned and the innate inferiority of women was accepted as established fact.⁵ Since I was not willing to remain in a discipline that marginalized my existence as a matter of principle, I sought out alternative views of the feminine. Venturing beyond the confines of the philosophy curriculum, I encountered the *yin*-based philosophy of Daoism in a religion class.

Although I was determined to pursue my interests in comparative philosophy as a graduate student, in the 1970s few philosophy departments offered such resources. So I settled for a solid grounding in Amero-eurocentric philosophy at a highly ranked campus. When I decided to focus my dissertation on Lao Zi and Spinoza, I met immediate resistance.⁶ Fortunately several faculty members were willing to trust my ability to complete the project. Only after I successfully completed my oral defense did the chair of my committee reveal how stiff the opposition to my proposal had been.

Fast forward to my teaching career: seeking a more receptive environment for pursuing Asian thought, I relocated to California from the Midwest. Friends had warned me about going to “La-La Land,” where they feared I soon be spending all my time meditating on the beach. Indeed there was evidence of non-Western philosophy on the West coast, but of questionable quality. One lecturer at my campus proudly added Buddhism to her Introduction to Philosophy class, but her chosen text was the Platonic reverie, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*. A tenured professor, and avowed Aristotelian ex-priest who had taken an interest in Chinese philosophy, decided to add a class to the curriculum. He seemed to assume that an understanding of Chinese

history or culture was irrelevant to interpreting the ancient texts. Eventually I inherited that class, which I continue to teach.

My first ten years or so were spent offering the standard curriculum, especially Introduction to Logic. Undaunted by the restrictive venue, I added a closing section on Asian logic to my classes. After inundating the students with well-ordered Aristotelian categories and the pristine certainties of propositional logic, we concluded with the unexpected Chinese logic of Xun Zi and the devastating iconoclasm of the reformed logician Nāgārjuna. A similar interweaving of comparative views was added to my introductory classes on values and metaphysics/epistemology. Then for another decade or so I divided my time between Philosophy and Asian Studies, which allowed for an exclusive Asian focus in some classes. Returning to Philosophy on a full-time basis, I have been able to expand the curriculum further with new classes on Buddhist Philosophy, Asian Philosophies of Leadership, Global Aesthetics,⁷ and various topics in an upper-division Asian Philosophies class and graduate seminars. On a campus with more than 35,000 students I remain the sole officially recognized expert on Chinese philosophy and am routinely introduced by my colleagues as the department's Asianist.

Stuck at the Crossroads

As Van Norden notes, the challenge of globalizing philosophy begins by reconsidering what constitutes Philosophy—not as a mere remnant of ancient Greek culture, but as a long-standing human activity practiced in diverse cultures. Amero-eurocentric philosophy gets stuck on such issues as free will vs. determinism and good vs. evil. However, these imagined dilemmas are rarely addressed in Chinese philosophy, which is more likely to fixate on tensions between loyalties to family and state. As an academic discipline in America, philosophy seemingly has reached an impasse. For decades it has been wandering in a labyrinth riddled with blind passages, including the miasma of Logical Positivism, the post-mortem of Post-Modernism and the self-defeating demise of Derridean Deconstruction. In some departments it has been reduced to the philosophy of *x* (technology, religion, medical ethics, science, logic, etc.). Many observers thus have concluded that the Emperor has no clothes! Cicero contends, “There is nothing so absurd but some philosopher has said it.”⁸ Bertrand Russell is on the record defining philosophy as “an unusually ingenious attempt to think fallaciously,”⁹ while Henry Brooks Adams associates philosophy with “unintelligible answers to insoluble problems.”¹⁰

A long line of philosophers inside the European tradition have been disenchanted by its epistemological posturings. For Pyrrho (360–275 BCE), who was very likely influenced by his exposure to Madhyamaka Buddhism, the true philosopher was the true skeptic—we don't even know we don't know.¹¹ René Descartes (1596–1650) provisionally applied the method of universal doubt (*Meditations on First Philosophy*), while David Hume (1711–1776) concluded that “all knowledge degenerates into probability” (*A Treatise of Human Nature*). Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) retreated to language, first as a set of universal propositions (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and later as a game (*Philosophical Investigations*).

When some of the most highly recognized professional philosophers were confronted with the question, “What have we learned from philosophy in the twentieth century?” at the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy, their responses were deeply disappointing.¹² W. V. O. Quine dodged the question and its implications, stating “I’m going to have to pass.” Peter Strawson “became obsessed by the use of the word ‘we’ and whether it was meant to be considered in a collectively or individual sense; ‘If it’s the former, the possibility of any reply seems remote. And if it’s the latter, there is no shortage of replies.’” Donald Davidson was equally evasive, merely noting how “very American” philosophy had been in the twentieth century, then clarifying, “To be honest, it was mostly Harvard.” The sole woman in the group, Marjorie Grene, also was bothered by the phrasing of the question, focusing on both “we” and “learned,” and then asked “Why is it important to do mathematical logic? Why?” This led to a condemnation of Cartesian dualism as well as its namesake, Descartes: “The only true statement he made was that he was born in 1596,” which she stated was also open to debate. Her attacks continued further afield: “Heidegger was evil and we ought to forget him,” while ethics is “just minding everyone’s business.” Karl-Otto Apel fondly recalled the good old days of neo-Kantian abstraction, now dismissed as “nonsense” in the wake of linguistic philosophy, concluding, “The only philosophical thinking left is *et cetera*.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr offered the only acknowledgement of cultural diversity, noting, “I take it this means American philosophy.” His advice was to adopt a more open-minded approach to the neglected philosophies of India, China, Japan, and Islam as a means to recover one’s own tradition’s “quest for truth and meaning.”

Such verbal sparring plays into another stereotype indulged in by journalist Terry McDermott when he described the philosophical activity of philosophy professor John Searle (University of California, Berkeley) as “boxing with words, a slugfest of minds” in which “the goal is to beat the

other guy's brains out. The object is to win."¹³ As we all are well aware, the original meaning of the Greek term for philosophy derives from the love (*philia*) of wisdom (*sophia*, embodied as a goddess). How did love degenerate into an extreme sport?

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), a voice calling out in the barren wilderness of Amero-eurocentric philosophy, has an answer to this question. As a philologist who “philosophizes with a hammer,” Nietzsche blamed philosophy’s degeneration on “The Problem of Socrates”:

I recognized Socrates and Plato to be symptoms of degeneration. ... Socrates’ decadence is suggested ... by the hypertrophy of the logical faculty. ... One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means. ... It can only be *self-defense* for those who no longer have other weapons. ... [H]e discovered a new kind of *agon* [contest; competition] He introduced a variation into the wrestling match. ... It is a self-deception on the part of philosophers and moralists if they believe that they are extricating themselves from decadence when they are merely waging war against it.¹⁴

Nietzsche’s complaint was based on his earlier assessment of *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, crediting the “pacification” of the Dionysian and Apollonian states with making tragedy possible.¹⁵ Socrates disrupted this balance, setting the stage for Plato’s erroneous “true world.” Nonetheless our aspiring Zarathustra eventually descended into a Dionysian stupor in which he himself took on the identity of Dionysos.

The inherent flaws of “the hypertrophy of the logical faculty” and hardwired dualism that continue to characterize Amero-eurocentric philosophy have been duly noted by Chinese philosophers such as Li Zehou:

from the very beginning aesthetic consciousness in the Chinese tradition has never been ascetic. Far from foreswearing sensory pleasures, it embraces, affirms, and celebrates them. ... [T]his affirmation of sensory pleasure is by no means Dionysian licentiousness or saturnalia.¹⁶

Chinese sages transformed and rationalized the power of the shamans into rites and rituals and interpreted these powers as manifested in music and poetry to be constructive. Western scholars considered the powers of the muses attractive and powerful, but whimsical, and a threat to the human's most treasured faculty: reason.¹⁷

Chinese models for a harmony of reason and emotion, wisdom and compassion, informed by both intellectual and sensory experiences, is of immense value to philosophers of all schools. It opens new venues for discourse concerning topics as diverse as human relationships, leadership, and the power of the arts. More importantly this nondual approach resonates with what I refer to as the Hybrid Brain, the two attentional networks in the bilateral brain recognized by neuroscience. Task-driven ventral attention central to linguistic and conceptual processing of information has been privileged in Amero-eurocentric philosophies. However, the default of stimulus-driven ventral attention has been denigrated as a manifestation of mere phenomenal shadows in Plato's dark cave. Chinese and other philosophies integrate both attentional networks, resulting in a much broader perspective on reality. Neuroscientists theorize that these networks work in tandem to maximize mutual efficiency: "task-relevant signals from the dorsal system 'filter' stimulus-driven signals in the ventral system [prone to 'distractibility'], whereas stimulus-driven 'circuit-breaking' signals from the ventral system provide an interrupt to the dorsal system [compromised by 'perseveration'], reorienting it toward salient stimuli."¹⁸

Consider Nietzsche's Three Metamorphoses in *Also Sprach Zarathustra*. Smug-and-satisfied camels (Platonists, Aristotelians, Cartesians, Kantians, and Hegelians) continue to schlep the burden of the "great minds" of the past. In response, rebellious lions (Nihilists, Existentialists, Post-Modernists, and Deconstructionists) rage against the past, while still trapped by what Nietzsche calls "chain-fever." Today's lions are often camels in disguise, self-deluded camels who continue to carry the burdens/icons of their chosen Masters, all the while proclaiming their iconoclasm. Daoist philosopher Zhuang Zi aptly characterizes such individuals as "the smug-and-satisfied" who "having learned the words of one master, put on a smug and satisfied look, privately much pleased with themselves, considering that what they have gotten is quite sufficient, and not even realizing that they haven't begun to get anything at all."¹⁹ Others have degenerated into predatory hyenas, interested only in delivering the kill shot in their philosophical slugfest.

Nietzsche's solution lies with the child—"innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred 'Yes.'"²⁰ Fang Dongmei 方東美 (1899–1977) understood this fully, comparing engagement with Chinese philosophy to flying a kite:

The whole cosmic power of creativity [is] ... displayed in the thin thread as well as the free spirit of the philosopher in the image of the butterfly. ... For anyone who wants to engage in the system-building of philosophy, there can be no better way than imitating the child of the story flying a kite, firmly and steadily—besides taking a flight in the air. Though unable to mount up to spaces on high, surely one feels the wondrous, all-propelling cosmic creative forces at work through the very delicate thin thread within one's firm grasp!²¹

In revisioning philosophy, we would do well to heed the words of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855): "What philosophers say about Reality is often as disappointing as a sign you see in a shop window, which reads Pressing Done Here. If you brought your clothes to be pressed, you would be fooled; for the sign is only for sale."²² Our words have been disconnected from meaning for too long. It is time for us to be productive once again, to deliver on our claims. Chinese philosophy has many worthy suggestions to offer. How can we draw them forth in a form accessible to our changing world?

Creative Hermeneutics

We need to engage our fellow philosophers and our students in the vibrant experience of Chinese philosophy that is as dynamic as kite-flying. Here alert interaction is mandatory, while the sharing of philosophical Big Data and algorithms is irrelevant. We must invite, and at times lure in, those conditioned by Amero-eurocentric assumptions so they might broaden their horizons and perhaps show the philosophical fly the way out of its self-created fly-bottle.

To do so I have adopted a methodology paralleling the Creative Hermeneutics of Charles Weihsun Fu 傅偉勳 (1933–1996). This five-step process begins with scholarly analysis: (1) textual criticism (What did the original text or author say?), (2) a contextual analysis (What did the text intend to say?), and (3) comparative analyses of the assumed intentions (What might the text have intended to say?). These three steps reflect routine scholarly investigations, equally applicable for

a museum curator who deals with the dead past. To address a living tradition we must push forward to philosophical synthesis: exploring (4) the best possible means of facilitating communication of its message (What should they have said?) by taking on the role of an adept translator of the original message willing and able to rise above cognitive literalism in rendering that message.²³ Most risky of all is the final stage, aimed at (5) conveying the contemporary relevance of Chinese philosophy, which constitutes what Dr. Fu has called a “creative inheritance” of the original message (What must we say now on their behalf?). Only then will Chinese philosophy be able to extend its reach as a global philosophy liberated from any temporal or geographical limitations.

In my own teaching I am adamant about demonstrating to my students the relevance of Chinese philosophy. I pair three distinctive philosophies deeply rooted in Chinese tradition with three pressing contemporary challenges—Confucianism and Feminism, Daoism and Ecology, and Buddhism and Post-Modern Science. Unlike “brain in the vat” thought experiments, current crises provide an opportunity to undertake a sweeping critique of the very values that have created them and offer alternatives from Chinese philosophical sources. We can test-drive methodologies that expand the possibilities for all forms of philosophy, not just Chinese philosophy, in the twenty-first century and beyond.

1. *Confucianism and Feminism*²⁴ To validate the continuing relevance of Kong Zi and his philosophy, we must confront a long-neglected fact: no philosophical doctrine can have a legitimate claim to universality if 51% of the human race—constituted by women—is excluded from its scope, or relegated to a merely minor, solely supportive role. If women as a group have no potential for realizing the Profound Person or *jun-zi* ideal, how can that ideal presume to carry cosmopolitan force? Creative Hermeneutics allows us to move beyond the sexist swamp of Kong Zi’s own time period (stages one through three) by focusing on what he should have said (a clear, unequivocal statement about women’s potential) and what he must say in our present temporal and cultural contexts. Nor need this require a violation of his inherent philosophical principles and position. Drawing on textual evidence of his openness to change in response to changing conditions, we can make a good case that he would be open to expanding the parameters of the ideal type, the *jun zi*, to include women.

2. *Daoism and Ecology*²⁵ A Daoist approach is sorely needed in the face of mounting ecological crises. To reverse our estrangement from the full range of reality, both egotistical aggressive action, (*wei* 為) and passive inaction (*bu-wei* 不為) must be supplanted by non-artificial interaction (*wei-wu-wei* 為無為). Thus we can recognize our intimate interconnection to the natural environment, as well as the survival value of being in harmony with Dao, flowing with nature itself (*zi-ran* 自然). Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi alike suggest significant areas for productive engagement by unthinking the needless complications imposed by cunning intellect, and undoing the damage that follows from those dysfunctional assumptions. Daoist lessons can address real-life cases such as doomed environmental manipulation (biocontrol) and the inherent hazards of multi-tasking. Viable solutions also are offered, as in this creative translation of chapter 19 of the *Dao De Jing*: “Discard human artifice, abandon profit—/corrupt CEOs, polluters, and toxic dumps will cease to exist.” Perhaps the most riveting example is a comparison of two water control systems—Dujiangyan in Sichuan province circa 250 BCE and the levee system in New Orleans. Despite thousands of years of technological advances at their disposal, the Army corps of Engineers could not keep New Orleans safe from Hurricane Katrina. Li Bing’s philosophy of going under to “dredge the sand deeper and build the dam lower”²⁶ has proven to be the wisest and most efficient in the end simply because it is the most natural.

3. *Buddhism and Post-Modern Science*²⁷ As scientists delve ever deeper into the subatomic quantum world and reach into the farthest reaches of outer space searching for the ground of reality, they are increasingly forced to face the fact of primal emptiness. Emptiness has proven to be much more than an idiosyncratic notion common among philosophies of an Asian persuasion. The Buddhist Chan philosopher Hui-neng deconstructs our fixations on thought (*nian* 念), memories (*xiang* 相), and finally on attachment or fixation itself (*zhu* 住): “Don’t create a bunch of delusions.”²⁸ Without (*wu* 無) these fixations we are liberated from the confines of mere thought, liberated from materialism, and liberated from even the concept of liberation (emptying emptiness). No longer held in thrall to conceptual or perceptual reification/thingification, the philosopher stops going in circles, like the yak in love with its own tail (our distinguished group from the World Congress of Philosophy?). Accordingly, we no longer disappoint Kierkegaard by offering misleading claims concerning reality.

Parting Thoughts

When modernization was confused and conflated with westernization in the twentieth century, it provoked many destabilizing trends. This epistemological error should not be repeated in the twenty-first century. Globalization need not entail reductionism. Why should Chinese philosophy need to prove it can fit the Amero-eurocentric template of philosophizing, when the validity of that template itself is suspect? Writing from the vantage point of psychology, Anthony J. Marsella voices similar concerns:

There is a growing international recognition that North American and Western European scientific and professional psychology is a “cultural construction.” ... The recognition is not new, but it is growing in proportion and consequence. In my opinion, this recognition needs to be nurtured and sustained given the changing political, economic, and cultural power-shifts occurring in the world. I say, let us learn, understand, and respect the many different psychologies of the world rather than accept as dogma the psychology of the West that has dominated education and practice for so many decades.²⁹

While Marsella wisely points to the political and moral consequences of ignoring conceptual imperialism, we must add to these the social, ecological, and even economic consequences sketched briefly above. Dysfunctional epistemologies and metaphysics do matter, and not just to philosophers!

The profession of philosophy in America today, which continues to be enmeshed in the aftermath of Plato’s “true world” reverie, seems to be emulating the Titanic on course to hit the iceberg of Reality. It remains fixated on the surface while ignoring the underlying depths. Like the Titanic, it has been warned of what is ahead by numerous philosophers, but has chosen to disregard the impending disaster. Many continue to rearrange the deck chairs oblivious to the impending demise, or, like the Titanic’s orchestra, provide a musical accompaniment as philosophy sinks into a watery grave. However, we need not book passage on this doomed vessel. We can abjure the temptations of its impressive size, highly-flaunted technology, and ostentatious accoutrements. The critical crossroads can be transformed from a place of frustration to a meeting place, a venue for a true meeting of minds.

I would like to close with a contemporary example of Creative Hermeneutics that was self-selected by students in my Buddhist Philosophy class in Spring 2010. On the final examination they were asked to identify the most *upāyic* image from the many we had sampled in class, that is, the image that most skillfully conveyed the underlying message of Buddhist philosophy. The overwhelming choice was a poem by the Pulitzer Prize-winning American poet and environmentalist Gary Snyder, entitled “Avocado.” Living in California, all the students could readily relate to the evocative image, which challenged them to draw a connection with the Buddhist concepts we had been discussing all semester. The fluctuating relationship to the avocado also resonated with their own experiences. Snyder may not be a philosopher himself, but he did more than provide the kind of misleading sign Kierkegaard disparages. His verse serves as a finger pointing to the moon, allowing each student to discover the underlying meaning for her or himself:

The Dharma is like an Avocado!
 Some parts so ripe you can't believe it,
 But it's good.
 And other places hard and green
 Without much flavor,
 Pleasing those who like their eggs well-cooked.

And the skin is thin,
 The great big round seed
 In the middle,
 Is your own Original Nature-
 Pure and smooth,
 Almost nobody ever splits it open
 Or ever tries to see
 If it will grow.

Hard and slippery,
 It looks like
 You should plant it—but then
 It shoots out thru the
 fingers—
 gets away.³⁰

Notes

1. Wang Bi, “Ming Xiang,” in *Zhou-yi lue-li* [A brief discussion of some basic philosophical ideas of the Yi Jing], trans. Charles Wei-hsun Fu.
2. Portions of this essay are derived from a presentation, “Applying Creative Hermeneutics to Chinese Philosophy in American Academia: The Path to Globalization,” at a conference on the Development of Chinese Philosophy in Recent 30 Years: Retrospect and Prospect sponsored by the International Society for Chinese Philosophy at Wuhan University, PRC, June 2010, and subsequently published in a Chinese translation.
3. Scott E. Page, *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
4. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine, 1998), 76–77.
5. In the days prior to affirmative action, male faculty made no attempt to hide their sexist views. At my first interview with the graduate advisor I was asked if I would be specializing in ethics or aesthetics, the only two fields of philosophy which he presumed were within the limited range of the female mind. He was quite astounded when I declared my preference for metaphysics. When I was about to graduate he refused to provide the same assistance offered to male graduates in finding a job because in his mind my true vocation was marriage (at the time I was not even engaged).
6. “The Philosophical Systematization of a ‘Feminine’ Perspective in terms of Taoism’s *Tao Te Ching* and the Works of Spinoza,” subsequently published as *The Undercurrent of Feminine Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1981).
7. The official title of this course is Non-Western Aesthetics, imposed by a department chair who encouraged me to write the proposal. Only later did I realize his true motive—to prevent me from sullyng the “real” aesthetics class I previously taught with Asian content.

8. Cicero, *De Divinatione*, trans. W. A. Falconer (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library and Harvard University Press, 1923), 2:119.
9. Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy's Ulterior Motives," *Unpopular Essays* (New York: Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1950), 45.
10. *The Education of Henry Adams* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918).
11. See Adrian Kuzminski, *Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism* (New York: Lexington Books, 2008).
12. Sarah Boxer, "At the End of a Century of Philosophizing, the Answer is Don't Ask," *New York Times* August 15, 1998, B9.
13. Terry McDermott, "No Limits Hinder UC Thinker," *Los Angeles Times* December 28, 1999, A23.
14. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 474–475, 477–478.
15. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), 26.
16. Li Zehou, *The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition*, trans. Maiji Bell Samei (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010), 10.
17. Li Zehou and Jane Cauvel, *Four Essays on Aesthetics: Toward a Global View* (New York: Lexington Books, 2006), 26.
18. Michael D. Fox, et al., "Spontaneous neuronal activity distinguishes human dorsal and ventral attention systems," *PNAS* 103:26 (June 27, 2006), 10046.
19. Zhuang Zi, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia, 1968), 275–276.
20. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Three Metamorphoses," in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 137–139.

21. Thomé H. Fang, *The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy*, <http://thomehfang.com/suncrates/spirit5.html>. See also Fang, Prologue to *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development* (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 1981).
22. Søren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), Volume 1, 31. In his letters to aesthete A, the self-avowed non-philosopher, ethically-oriented B observes, “What unites you [with the philosophers] is that life comes to a stop. To the philosopher world history is concluded, and he mediates. . . . [T]he philosopher, he is outside, he is not in the game, he sits and grows old listening to the songs of long ago” Vol. 2, 175–176.
23. Buddhism has a longstanding tradition of hermeneutics particularly relevant to this stage. The four rules of Buddhist textual interpretation include emphasizing the doctrine over its propounder, the spirit over the word, meaning over interpretation, and direct wisdom over discursive consciousness. See Étienne Lamotte, “The Assessment of Textual Interpretation in Buddhism” in *Buddhist Hermeneutics*, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 11–27.
24. See Sandra A. Wawrytko, “Kong Zi as Feminist: Confucian Self-cultivation in a Contemporary Context,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 27.2 (2000): 171–186; reprinted in *Classical & Medieval Literature Criticism*, vol. 63, ed. Jelena Krstovic (Blackwell Publishing, 2004).
25. See Sandra A. Wawrytko, “The Viability (Dao) and Virtuosity (De) of Daoist Ecology: Reversion (Fu) as Renewal,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 32.1 (March 2005): 89–103.
26. Li Bing’s “Six-character Formula” is displayed in Erwang Temple dedicated to him at the site of the Dujiangyan Irrigation System in China’s Sichuan Province.
27. See Sandra A. Wawrytko, “Chinese Philosophy’s Resonance with Post-Modern Science: Chan Insights on Emptiness from Master Hui-neng,” *International Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Culture* 1.1 (Spring 2002), <http://www.thomehfang.com/suncrates4/8huineng.htm> and <http://www.purifymind.com/PostModernSci.htm.ta>

28. Hui-neng, *The Platform Sutra: The Zen Teachings of Hui-neng*, trans. and commentary Red Pine (Emeryville: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2006), 174.
29. Anthony J. Marsella, "Some Reflections on Potential Abuses of Psychology's Knowledge and Practices," *Psychological Studies* 54 (March 2009): 23–27. Professor Marsella has identified ten assumptions that "emerged from history as the uncontested reality of Western Europe and North America. A reality to be imposed on the rest of the world." These range from reductionism and scientism to materialism and objectivity.
30. Gary Snyder, *Turtle Island* (New York: New Directions, 1974), 61.