Why I Shall Continue to Use and Teach Just War Theory

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In their “Appeal to the Catholic Church to Re-Commit to the Centrality of Gospel Nonviolence,” issued in April 2016, some eighty activists and scholars, whose gathering at the Vatican was co-sponsored by Pax Christi International and the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, bluntly called into question the future of just war theory in Catholic social teaching. Their statement implored Catholics to revive and reestablish “Gospel nonviolence” as the Church’s approach for dealing with conflict, and it urged Pope Francis to write an encyclical on nonviolence and peacemaking in order to show official, magisterial support for their proposal. As for the future of just war theory, specifically, the declaration exhorted the Catholic Church “no longer [to] use or teach ‘just war theory.’” Why? The participants asserted, “We believe that there is no ‘just war,’” because just war theory has been “used to endorse rather than prevent or limit war,” and because it “undermines the moral imperative to develop tools and capacities for nonviolent transformation of conflict.” In this essay, I, as a Catholic “just war” theological ethicist, offer a critical response to the Appeal.

While I acknowledge that just war theory, of course, has been misused historically, I disagree with the Appeal’s call for the Catholic Church to jettison this important framework for the ethics of war and peace. For, as Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., has rightly put it, “Announcements of the irrelevancy, demise or uselessness of the just war tradition are commonly made,” but “the number of books published in recent years that take just war thinking seriously and offer thoughtful exposition, commentary and revision of the tradition suggests there remains a large audience of readers who find the wisdom of that politico-moral tradition still worth considering.” Accordingly, in what follows, I mostly examine some antecedent calls by Catholics to reconsider just war theory in order to show what’s not so new, as well as what’s new, about the Appeal’s imploration, before I identify a number of problems with the Appeal’s critique of just war theory. I then conclude with an autobiographical account of why I will continue to teach just war theory, and I propose “integral peace” as an ethical framework that encompasses not only “active
nonviolence on the road to just peace” (to use the language of the Appeal) but also the moral reasoning traditionally referred to as just war theory.⁴

Not the First to Do So: Antecedent Calls to Reconsider Just War

This is not the first time that just war theory has been called into question by Catholics, including over the last century or so, particularly in connection with modern, total warfare. Indeed, in 1932, during the period between World Wars I and II, Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber observed:

> We live in a period of transition; and just as in other questions, so, too, in the question of war and peace, a change of heart will be effected […]. Even the teaching of moral theology in regard to war will speak a new language. It will remain true to its old principles, but in regard to the question of the permissibility of war, it will take account of the new facts!⁵

These words from the Archbishop of Munich, Germany, were quoted several years later by the American Benedictine monk, Virgil Michel, O.S.B., as a springboard for his own treatment of the ethics of war in his book, *The Christian in the World*, published in 1939, a year after his untimely death at the age of 49.

Michel was especially appalled by the devastation of modern, total warfare. “Never before,” he wrote, thinking of the First World War, “was there such destruction by war of lives and families, cities and towns, whole countrysides with all that was in them.”⁶ And in the wake of that devastating war, Michel keenly observed the festering suspicions and accompanying arms races that moved him to warn of “the coming of another world war in our century […] [that] will be much worse in every way than the last one.”⁷ Michel emphatically condemned deliberate attacks against non-combatants by “airbombs, poisonous gases and death-dealing germs.”⁸ Such atrocities led him to ask “a most important question: that of the justice of war today.”⁹ Accordingly, after enumerating the traditional just war criteria, Michel scrutinized each one in view of the changed conditions of warfare in modern times. Because of “the powerful weapons of destruction that modern science and technic” have produced, he observed that it has become too difficult to avoid killing non-combatants.¹⁰ Moreover, determining whether or not an act of aggression is unjust no longer was “so clear-cut” since most conflicts actually have “roots and causes going back into
These concerns caused Michel to question the moral legitimacy of any war whatsoever in the modern era.

Still, Michel neither attacked just war theory nor jettisoned it. Indeed, it was just war reasoning and principles that led him to make these critical judgments about modern war. Still, Michel wrote that “even a legitimate war of self-defense must be considered a great evil (even if not a moral evil, or a sin), for it, too, will be fraught with all the horrible consequences that modern warfare entails.” To be sure, such a just war, in his view, was much less likely in the early decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, Michel was ahead of his time when he called upon nations to respect and legally recognize absolute pacifists who adhere to Christ’s “counsels of perfection” and thereby oppose all wars. At the same time, Michel recommended that individual citizens be ever vigilant, carefully investigating via just war principles the moral rightness of a conflict, and consulting with their spiritual advisors for prudent counsel. If there’s any doubt about the moral justification of a particular war, according to Michel, the citizen should be able to refuse to take up arms—what is now referred to as selective conscientious objection, although it does not yet have the same legal recognition as does so-called general conscientious objection. In the end, Michel offered what Faulhaber called for: a heartfelt, honest, and stringent application of the just war tradition’s “old principles” in light of the “new facts” of modern, total war. In doing so, though, Michel did not discard just war theory.

In many respects—not only on war and peace but also on liturgical renewal—Michel anticipated significant developments at the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). Its final document, Gaudium et spes, called upon the entire Church to “undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude” (§80). Not only does this line echo Faulhaber’s words from decades earlier, but, as we shall see, it is also evidence of what the 2016 Appeal calls a “different path [that] is unfolding in recent Catholic social teaching.” As part of this reevaluation, the Council broke new ground and emphasized that all Christians should work toward the establishment of peace, which “is not merely the absence of war” (§78). Drawing on Isaiah 32:7, the Council bishops said that peace is “an enterprise of justice,” which is “never attained once and for all, but must be built up ceaselessly.” Thus, in an unexpected departure from previous official Catholic teaching, the Council praised those, including laity, “who renounce the use of violence in the vindication of their rights and who resort to methods of defense which are otherwise available to weaker parties too, provided this can be done without injury to the rights and duties of others or of the community
itself” (§78). Moreover, the Council did another first by adding that governments should legally recognize conscientious objection. Even with these significant steps, however, Vatican II neither abandoned just war thinking nor made nonviolence the norm for all Catholics.

Indeed, the Council did not revoke the traditional right of national self-defense: “As long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted” (§79). Although the Council did not explicitly mention “just war,” it invoked the traditional *jus ad bellum* criteria of legitimate authority, just cause (i.e., legitimate defense), and last resort. Aggressive wars that seek to subjugate other nations were forbidden, which would be a violation of the criterion of just cause for war. Similarly, the Council expressed strong concerns about the development of “scientific weapons” during the Cold War arms race that “can inflict massive and indiscriminate destruction far exceeding the bounds of legitimate defense” (§80). Modern total warfare, which by its very nature encompasses and indiscriminately harms civilian population centers, was condemned unequivocally by the bishops as a crime against God and humanity. In addition, the Council presciently warned about terrorism as a new method of waging such indiscriminate warfare, and it also prohibited soldiers’ blind obedience to unlawful commands. In these latter concerns, and again even though it did not use the names, the Council employed the traditional *jus in bello* criteria of discrimination (i.e., noncombatant immunity) and proportionality. The Council’s use of such principles is evidence that the “evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude” does not mean a total rejection of the just war tradition but rather a more serious application of it. As such, the Council’s teaching is much like Michel’s, as well as in sync with the words he uses from Faulhaber, though they are not cited.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the section of *Gaudium et spes* in question is subtitled “The Fostering of Peace and the Promotion of a Community of Nations,” indicating the Council’s emphasis on a just peace, even if it did not use that term either. Earlier in 1965, Pope Paul VI pleaded to the United Nations General Assembly: “No more war, war never again.” Accordingly, the Council called for the abolition of war through international institutions and law, declaring: “It is our clear duty, then, to strain every muscle as we work for the time when all war can be completely outlawed by international consent” (§82). It went on to call for “the establishment of some universal public authority acknowledged as such by all, and endowed with effective power to safeguard, on the behalf of all, security, regard for justice, and respect for rights” (§82). In other
words, the Council recognized the need for an international institution—akin to an international police force—to enforce the law outlawing war in order to protect against unjust threats to human security and human rights. The Council left open, however, whether or not this “effective power” was to be unarmed and nonviolent.

These developments from Vatican II inspired subsequent Catholic teaching, including the U.S. Catholic bishops’ 1983 pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response. There the bishops wrote, “Peacemaking is not an optional commitment. It is a requirement of our faith. We are called to be peacemakers, not by some movement of the moment, but by our Lord Jesus.”20 Peacemaking, however, does not entail only absolute pacifism or nonviolence, for the bishops added that it is “the how of defending peace which offers moral options.”21 Indeed, on the one hand, the bishops applauded those Christians who renounce the use of violent force and instead employ methods of active nonviolent resistance to defend the innocent from aggression. In the words of the bishops, “We believe work to develop nonviolent means of fending off aggression and resolving conflict best reflect the call of Jesus both to love and to justice.”22 On the other hand, the bishops, acknowledged that “the fact of aggression, oppression and injustice in our world also serves to legitimate the resort to weapons and armed force” in defense of the innocent.23 Ten years later, in the wake of the nonviolent velvet revolution in Eastern Europe, the U.S. bishops, in The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace, extended their affirmation of nonviolence from individuals to movements, even as they also expanded the scope of armed defense from national self-defense to humanitarian interventions in cases like Rwanda.24 In short, the bishops continued to hold together both nonviolence and just war as ethical approaches for the legitimate defense of the innocent.

Reflecting on these developments, Drew Christiansen, S.J., summarizes Catholic teaching as having become “more stringent in its application of just war thinking and more accepting of nonviolent alternatives even by the state.”25 And, yet, not all Catholics were satisfied by this two-fold approach that holds onto the possibility, limited as it has become, of just war. Indeed, a half century after Michel and just over a quarter century after Vatican II, in 1991, an unsigned editorial, “Modern War and Christian Conscience,” appearing in the Jesuit periodical La Civiltà Cattolica, went further by calling for the abandonment of just war theory because “the theoretical categories and moral judgments that applied to past wars no longer seem applicable to modern warfare.”26 According to the editorial, because modern war has become total, it cannot be conducted according
to the criteria of the just war tradition, such as distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants. Especially with the development of nuclear arms, entire populations have become targets. Such weapons, “perfected by scientific inventions,” cannot be subject to restraint; they necessarily lead to escalation and indiscriminate devastation, planting the seeds, moreover, of future wars. For these reasons, the editorial called for the abandonment of the just war tradition.27

At the same time, the editorial’s objections to the atrocities of modern warfare, much like Michel’s, were actually made using just war criteria. After all, to say that today’s weapons are “indiscriminate” is to use the jus in bello criterion of discrimination. In addition, the editorial acknowledged later that a justifiable war would be “a war of pure defense against an aggression actually taking place,”28 which is an application of the jus ad bellum criterion of just cause. Hence, for the editorial, the possibility of just war is much narrower and limited—but nonetheless still a possibility, even as the editorial asserts that there has been “a development of the Christian conscience regarding the absolute immorality of war.”29

Seemingly similar to the editorial, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, when asked in 2003 about whether the U.S.-led war against Iraq fits “within the canons of the ‘just war,’” responded: “[W]e must begin asking ourselves whether as things stand, with new weapons that cause destruction that goes well beyond the groups involved in the fight, it is still licit to allow that a ‘just war’ might exist.”30 Yet, when he, as Pope Benedict, in 2007 in his second World Day of Peace message,31 devoted attention to “certain recent situations of war” (§14), he continued to affirm, on the one hand, that “[i]n Christ we can find the ultimate reason for becoming staunch champions of human dignity and courageous builders of peace” (§16) while, on the other hand, he called on “the international community [to] reaffirm international humanitarian law, and apply it to all present-day situations of armed conflict, including those not currently provided for by international law […]” (§16). Indeed, he called upon nations to establish “clearer rules” and “norms of conduct” for defending the innocent and limiting “the damage as far as possible,” while concurrently he repeated the refrain that “war always represents a failure for the international community and a grave loss for humanity” (§16). With regard to the “clearer rules” or “norms of conduct” for which he urged, though, what might they look like? Here Benedict footnoted the section of the Catechism (§§2307–2317) that lists “the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the ‘just war’ doctrine” (§2309), which he regarded as offering “strict and precise criteria” (§16, endnote 7). Again, we have here what Drew Christiansen, S.J., describes as a “hybrid
approach” or “as a composite of nonviolent and just-war elements” in Catholic teaching on war and peace today.32

With Pope Francis, I think this trajectory is being honed even further.33 The April 2016 gathering at the Vatican and its Appeal are evidence of this. Nevertheless, the Appeal’s explicit call for the Church to no longer use or teach just war theory, I think, goes too far.34

The Appeal and Just War Theory

With this background and context, it is worth noting, first of all, that the two-page Appeal’s criticism of just war theory actually presupposes just war principles in order to critique how most, if not all, wars have been initiated and conducted. To be sure, the Appeal explicitly mentions “just war” and “just war theory” only four times, with scare quotes bracketing each reference—probably because, as the statement’s signatories confess, “We believe that there is no ‘just war.’” Why? Because just war theory has “[t]oo often […] been used to endorse rather than prevent or limit war.” In other words, the *jus ad bellum* criteria for evaluating when going to war is morally justified have not succeeded in saying “no” or preventing war, and the *jus in bello* criteria for the morally just conduct of war have failed to limit it. But to make these claims, the Appeal uses just war reasoning and principles. If these are no longer to be taught or used, how will moral criticisms be made about going to and fighting war?

Plus, it simply isn’t true that just war theory has been used only to endorse war, failing to prevent or limit it. Even if governments might use it as a “smoke screen” to rationalize unjust war, in the months before the invasion of Iraq, most Christian ethicists and theologians scrupulously criticized, on just war grounds, the U.S.’s plans for preemptive war.35 Similar critical analysis continued during the fighting of those wars, as well as after the shooting supposedly stopped.36 Likewise, the U.S. Catholic bishops issued public statements and letters to government officials, including President Bush, that drew on just war criteria in order to raise “moral concerns and questions” about the war in Iraq.37 At the time, Pope John Paul II and other Vatican officials, including Italian Cardinal Pio Laghi who was sent by the pope to meet with President Bush on March 5, 2003, also expressed serious reservations about whether U.S. military action against Iraq would be a just war.38 Moreover, when the U.S. ambassador to the Vatican invited American Catholic Michael Novak to give a lecture there on why the Iraq war would be just, most attendees
were not persuaded on just war grounds. Thus, there have indeed been Catholic theologians, ethicists, clergy, and even popes who employ just war reasoning seeking to prevent or limit war.

The Appeal also problematically assumes that there is—in theory and in practice—only one “just war” theory. Instead, I would use scare quotes for a different reason, namely, that historically and at present there are multiple “just war theories.” Even among Christians, including Catholics, there are more “hawkish” and more “dovish” versions of just war theory. As the previous section demonstrates, Catholic magisterial teaching—like most Catholic theological ethicists today, I would add—is in the “dovish” camp. Even if debate has continued about whether nonviolence and just war share a presumption against war and for peace, most just war theorists now understand just war as directed by and aimed at a just peace. For example, during the 1990s and subsequently, many just war theorists have collaborated with pacifists and advocates of nonviolence to contribute to a project on “just peacemaking” practices that can effectively minimize the likelihood of war. This development, along with recent just war theorizing about jus post bellum—justice in the wake of war—is counterevidence to the Appeal’s assertion that just war “undermines the moral imperative to develop tools and capacities for nonviolent transformation of conflict.” Therefore, I agree with the Appeal’s call for “the Catholic Church [to] develop and consider shifting to a Just Peace approach,” but it is important to recognize both that this shift has already been underway and that just war theorists, too, have been contributing to it.

Further, I wish that the Appeal had explored the meaning of shift. When the Appeal calls for the Church no longer to use or teach just war theory, shift seems to mean switch from. Instead, I would understand shift as meaning pivoting, analogous to a pivot foot in basketball. The pivot foot could be nonviolence, but the other foot still allows for the possibility of armed force in accordance with just war reasoning and principles, with both feet being used towards the goal of just peace. Admittedly, the problem we have is practice—in other words, moral formation, not only with nonviolence but also with just war. As Patrick T. McCormick has noted, the actual “default position” of the “vast majority of American Catholics and Christians” is that they evidently “approach the moral analysis of every call to arms with a strong presumption in favor of war.” Even just war theorists recognize this to be a serious problem. Regrettably, the Appeal makes just war adherents their opponents rather than teammates.

This is odd, moreover, given that active nonviolent methods must likewise be governed by moral reasoning and criteria. After all, in Gaudium et spes, the Council qualifies its support of
nonviolence: “provided this can be done without injury to the rights and duties of others or of the community itself” (§78). The Council’s support is conditional—implying that nonviolent methods sometimes can be harmful and thus morally problematic, even unjustified.

As Lloyd Steffen has observed, “just war thinking is itself an expression of a more basic approach to ethics,” one that includes elements of deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics.46 Put differently, there is an “ethic that lies behind just war” that can be “applicable to all kinds of ethical issues,” as well as for uses of force other than war.47 Indeed, Steffen isn’t alone in making such an observation. The influential bioethicist James Childress, who has also written groundbreaking analyses of both nonviolent civil disobedience and just war theory, has noted:

The “just war doctrine” offers a set of considerations for determining when war is justified, and analogous criteria must be employed in determining when civil disobedience is justified, although perhaps it is more accurate to suggest that civil disobedience is subject to the same general demands of morality as any other action rather than that it is illuminated by just war criteria. However that may be, certainly the appropriate criteria for evaluating civil disobedience coincide to a great extent with traditional just war criteria such as just cause, good motives and intentions, exhaustion of normal procedures for resolving disputes, reasonable prospect for success, due proportion between probable good and bad consequences, and right means.48

This makes sense if we take into consideration Reinhold Niebuhr’s classic point that it is a mistake to assume “that violence is […] intrinsically evil and nonviolence intrinsically good.”49 Both are coercive, and even nonviolent methods can harm others. Niebuhr highlights some examples and concludes, “It is impossible to coerce a group without damaging both life and property and without imperiling the interests of the innocent with those of the guilty.”50 The Appeal, however, dichotomizes between “creative and active nonviolence” and “all forms of violence,” and between “nonviolent resistance strategies” and “violent ones.” It assumes just war is violent, and it conflates as synonymous “violence, injustice, or war.” At the same time, it recognizes that a “Just Peace approach” requires “specific criteria, virtues, and practices to guide our actions.” But, won’t these be the same criteria, virtues, and practices that Daniel M. Bell, Jr., has argued ought to frame and
inform just war? For his part, Steffen writes, “The ethic that underwrites just war thinking may appear to be focused on the coercive force of violence, but the normative guide against using force applies not only to uses of force that are destructive and violent but to any use of force.” He shows how Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., both recognized this, and how they used just war reasoning, even if not explicitly or by name, when arguing that nonviolent resistance, which is a form of coercion, must be morally justified in response to an injustice (just cause), resorted to after non-coercive means have failed (i.e., persuasion), and the like. This attention to the deeper ethic behind just war or armed force, and as well active nonviolence or unarmed force, may serve as a helpful springboard for the future of not only just war theory but also active nonviolence.

**An Autobiographical Conclusion and a Call for “Integral Peace” as “Just Peace”**

Why do I care about this so much? A lot of it has to do with my own experience. The Appeal shares that the April 2016 gathering was comprised of “lay people, theologians, members of religious congregations, priests, and bishops” from “Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Oceana,” with many of them practicing “justice and peace” while living “in communities experiencing violence and oppression.” Perhaps, then, another reason why the Appeal refers to just war as “theory” rather than as an ethic or a tradition is that it assumes just war theorists have been too theoretical, maybe too abstract, and thus not applicable in the real world. This may be the case for some, but not for me.

I grew up in a blue collar, working family—farmers and factory workers—and then my mother became a police officer. As a child, I dreamed of becoming a number of careers: priest, politician, lawyer, soldier. Raised Catholic, I admired saints like Francis of Assisi and fervently sang “Let there be peace on earth, and let it begin with me.” But I also played “army” with my toy soldiers and with my neighbors and our toy guns. I remember, too, how my grandmother, Grandma Hug, once told me, “War is bad.” As an undergraduate student, and as a first generation college student in my family, I worked full-time for the local metropolitan sheriff’s department where my mother worked. I was also in Army R.O.T.C. and even trained a bit at Fort Benning in Georgia. At the same time, though, I wrestled with the ethics of the use of force. I saw first-hand, as the Appeal puts it, “communities experiencing violence and oppression.” Not only did I witness unjust use of force (i.e., “violence and oppression”) by some of my fellow officers and by the criminal justice system; I also saw the unjust use of force that people commit against each other. One of my
professors had introduced me to Catholic just war teaching, which I found helpful for framing when and how the use of force is morally justified with regard to both the military and law enforcement.

At the same time, I stumbled across and read some books by the Protestant pacifist theologian Stanley Hauerwas, which I found provocative and appealing. Thus, when I graduated with my B.A., I resigned from the sheriff’s department and went to Duke Divinity School to be challenged and become more informed on this question in Christian ethics. After that, I went to the University of Notre Dame, where I studied with, and was graduate assistant for, the Mennonite pacifist theologian John Howard Yoder, who had influenced Hauerwas to become a Christian pacifist. Like Hauerwas, Yoder challenged me to be, as the subtitle of one of his many books puts it, more honest about just war theory. Just as Yoder took Christian just war theory seriously, I took—and continue to take—pacifism and nonviolence seriously. Indeed, as a professor for the past two decades now, whenever I teach about pacifism and nonviolence in the classroom and at parishes, students and church members often express their surprise to find out that I am not an absolute pacifist. In addition, I have taken students to Northern Ireland and to Nicaragua to meet and learn from people who have lost loved ones and who have been scarred either by violence inflicted upon them, or by violence that they have inflicted upon others, what we now refer to as “moral injury.” At the same time, for a couple of years after I first became a professor, I was also a reserve police officer, teaching ethics for a metropolitan police department while also patrolling part-time for it. I have endured violence, and I have used force. I am not pro-war. I am not pro-violence. I am not pro-militarism. But I am not a pacifist. Nor am I a Catholic who puts all of his eggs in the nonviolence basket.

This side of the coming of God’s kingdom in which justice and peace perfectly embrace, I am a “both/and” Catholic who continues to hold that, even as we rightly place more emphasis on nonviolence and “just peace,” we must be able to keep a space—narrow and limited, yes—for armed force. Whether we continue to call it “just war theory” or “legitimate defense” or “the responsibility to protect” (R2P) or “just policing,” there needs to be a mode of moral reasoning accompanied by criteria, virtues, and practices for the ethical use of force, armed or not. As Ralph Potter once put it, when “any use of force” is subjected to moral analysis and evaluation, “some analogue to the just war doctrine emerges.”
In short, Catholics should avoid the extremes of, on the one hand, “laxism” that might slide into some form of permissive hawkish “realism” and, on the other hand, restrictive dovish “rigorism” that is too absolute. There is traditionally a place for “gradualism” allowing for the laity to “gradually adhere to it.” In the meantime, we all ought to work toward a “just peace.” A Catholic approach, in other words, might seek to “integrate” these efforts—much as Pope Francis has called for with an “integral ecology,” or Pope Paul VI did with “integral human development.” A “just peace” will be an “integral peace” by integrating just peacemaking and peacebuilding practices, active nonviolence, and just use of unarmed and armed force.

Notes


4. It should be noted that just war is not a theory that is statically set in stone; instead, it is a living tradition that is composed of many theories (secular, Christian, philosophical, non-
Western, etc.) and that has developed and continues to do so in light of new circumstances, technologies, and insights.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 183.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. The parenthetical clarification is his.

13. Ibid., 185.


21. Ibid., §73.

22. Ibid., §78.

23. Ibid.


28. Ibid., 453–454.

29. Ibid., 454.


34. My historical survey here admittedly has omitted attention to other prominent figures in U.S. Catholicism, including John A. Ryan and John Courtney Murray, S.J. For a helpful


47. Ibid., 15.


50. Ibid.


